During the debate over passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in 2002, and in the litigation which followed, there was widespread speculation about the impact of forcing presidential candidates and national party committees to rely on limited contributions from individual donors. In previous elections, unlimited "soft money" donations to parties, allowed under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA as amended in 1974) only for the support of general party activities, had been used to benefit specific candidates. When BCRA banned all soft money donations to parties, politicians and analysts alike worried that the end of soft money would seriously hamper electioneering. Instead, a growing number of individual donors, particularly small donors, are bolstering the election process as never before. This paper discusses how candidates and parties have adapted to BCRA, as shown in donation receipts from election cycles before and after the legislation took effect.
Early predictions about BCRA's impact ranged from dismal to bright. Political scientist Sidney Milkis warned, "BCRA threatens the reinvigoration of national parties and the revitalization of America's federal democracy" (2003, 43) . Another commentator described BCRA as a "suicide bill for the Democrats" (Gitell 2003, 106) . But not all commentators on BCRA were pessimists about the ability of presidential candidates and party committees to function in a world without soft money. As Jonathan Krasno and Frank Sorauf argued, "Certainly, BCRA's implementation will decrease the amount of money available to state and local party organizations in the short turn, but that loss will stimulate them to broaden their base of contributors and raise more hard money. Belt tightening will also force them to use their money more efficiently and effectively" (2003, 57) .
In practice, the parties have adapted well to BCRA. National party committees made a final push in 2002 to acquire as much soft money as possible, which leaves as no surprise that the Senate and House party committees raised less in 2004 than in 2002 (Magleby and Monson 2004, 274-276; Kolodny and Dwyre 2006, 184) . However, the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee raised more hard money alone in 2004 than they had in both soft and hard money contributions combined in 2002 (Kolodny and Dwyre, (183) (184) .
BCRA doubled what individuals could contribute to candidates from $2,000 per election cycle ($1,000 in the nomination phase and $1,000 in the general election) to $4,000 in 2004, again evenly divided between the nomination and general election phases. BCRA also indexed these limits for inflation, such that in 2008 the maximum an individual can give a candidate during the cycle is $4,600. BCRA also increased the aggregate limit for an individual giving to candidates, party committees, and political action committees (PACs) in a two-year election cycle from $25,000 to $95,000. Indexed for inflation, the combined donation limit in 2008 is $108,200. Of this amount only $42,700 can go to candidates, leaving $65,500 to be divided among PACs and national, state, and local parties. Of those funds, a maximum of $10,000 may be given to any one state or local party committee, a maximum of $28,500 to any one national party committee, and a maximum of $5,000 to any one PAC, with total PAC donations not exceeding $40,000 (Center for Responsive Politics 2007).
By building in a fraction of the aggregate limit that could only go to political parties, the BCRA reformers created an incentive for donors to include party committees in their election cycle contribution allocations. What has been the actual experience of presidential candidates and party committees in raising money from individual donors under these new BCRA contribution limits?
The scope of this study is to compare individual contributions to presidential candidates and party committees in the year prior to the 2000, 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. This limited scope is necessitated by the timing of this publication. But there is widespread agreement in the literature on the importance of fundraising in what some have called the "money primary" that occurs in the years prior to the year of the presidential caucuses, primaries, and general election (Goff 2004) . Since most candidates who do poorly in early states, particularly Iowa and New Hampshire, quickly withdraw, the importance of raising and spending money in those early states cannot be overemphasized. This is especially true as the momentum generated from early wins spurs additional funds and media attention to sustain a campaign, while early losses can cause a campaign to dry up rapidly (Magleby and Mayer 2008, 147-149 George W. Bush in his 2000 race was the first non-self-financed candidate seeking a major party nomination to not participate in the FECA presidential nomination matching fund provision for the caucuses and primaries. All other announced candidates in 2000 accepted matching funds except for the largely self-financed Steve Forbes. In the 1997-99 period, Bush built a now legendary fundraising operation with individual donors, many of whom gave the maximum allowable. His approach relied heavily on personal contacts and a system of hierarchal contributors called the "Pioneers," a group of 226 business executives, political leaders, lawyers, and lobbyists, who raised $100,000 or more each in $1,000 increments. They raised about one fourth of Bush's total funds (Green and Bigelow 2002, 59 ).
In the 2001-03 period, former Vermont governor Howard Dean, who raised less than half as much as John Edwards or John Kerry in the first quarter of 2003, saw his contributions outpace his opponents' thereafter and ended up with more than twice as much money raised from individuals as any of the Democratic candidates.
George W. Bush's reelection campaign by year's end 2003 matched in receipts those of all of his Democratic opponents combined. Bush enlarged his hierarchical contributor program, adding "Rangers" (fundraisers who raised at least $200,000) and "Super Rangers" (Rangers who raised an additional $300,000 for the Republican National Committee), to his $100,000-level Pioneers. Bush again relied on large individual donors, with 61 percent of his primary season receipts coming from maximum-donation, or "max-out," donors; though maximum-level donations made up just 17 percent of his receipts in the "bridge" period between primary season and the general election contest (Green 2006, 103) .
Bush's general election opponents in 2000 and 2004 also had similar fundraising structures, with status ascribed to the aggregate amounts raised. Al Gore had his "Board of Directors"; John Kerry, "Trustees," "Vice Chairs," and "Co-Chairs." The primary stage of the 2004 cycle was essentially a large-donor game.
Contributions from individuals increased dramatically in 2007 as compared to 1999 and 2003 . Three candidates raised more in the first quarter of 2007 than was raised by any candidate in a first quarter in a prior year. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and Mitt Romney all raised in excess of $20 million from individuals in the first quarter, and while Romney's receipts from individuals dipped in the second and subsequent quarters, Clinton and Obama raised more money from individuals in the second quarter than they had in the first. 
SMALLER INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE INTERNET
The John McCain campaign in 1999 and 2000 made some early use of the Internet as a mode of raising money, pulling in a modest but pioneering $5 million to $6 million online (Green and Bigelow, 63) . In 2003, having seen the impact the Internet was having for interest groups like MoveOn.Org and others, the Howard Dean campaign made online donations a primary source of funds. About half of Dean's $51 million raised came over the Internet, with over one million unique donors-a remarkable number of participants, just reached and touted this cycle by Barack Obama. Dean's campaign manager, Joe Trippi, characterized Internet fundraising as "the opening salvo in a revolution" (Patterson 2006, 81) .
An The Internet has afforded candidates new tactics in the race for funds. Social networking sites like Facebook.com and MySpace.com allow candidates to connect with and organize more voters, especially young voters; more importantly, these sites provide free, simple, and effective tools that allow supporters to organize themselves. Independent sites like UltiMitt.org and ActBlue.com have brought money and volunteers to the candidates. Additionally, media posting sites like YouTube.com and Flickr.com give opposition researchers and imaginative supporters a platform to pillory or praise candidates. For example, as of this printing, hip-hop artist will.i.am's Obama-supporting music video "Yes We Can," has received over 12 million views on YouTube.com alone. But the Internet's greatest strength may be how it allows nearly instantaneous communication with supporters. For instance, when conservative pundit Ann Coulter criticized John Edwards in a speech, his campaign immediately posted the offensive video prominently on its website and sent out an email appealing for $100,000 in "Coulter Cash." The campaign raised $300,000 from the incident (Frontrunner 2007) .
Recent press reports, some not confirmed by candidates, indicate that the surge in individual contributions to McCain, Clinton, and Obama has continued into 2008. During January, Obama is reported to have raised $36 million compared to Clinton's near $14 million and McCain's $12 million (Luo and Zelleny 2008) . In February, Clinton raised another $35 million, but Obama topped that with an estimated $50 million (Luo and Zelleny (Luo and Zelleny) . The Clinton campaign reported that $30 million of its $35 million raised in February, or more than 85 percent, "had come in over the Internet or in other small donations." Individuals wanting to give the maximum allowable could give $2,300 for the nomination phase of the 2008 election. Table 3 provides the amount raised by each candidate from individuals giving $2,300, as well as the proportion of the candidate's total receipts raised from these max-out donations through 2007. Hillary Clinton's campaign through 2007 relied much more heavily on individuals contributing the maximum allowable. Half of the money she raised from individuals in this period came from max-out donors. Rudy Giuliani was the only candidate in this period to raise a higher proportion of his money from this type of donor, raising an impressive $27.9 million from these donors alone. While Obama far outdistanced all other candidates in money raised from donors contributing under $200, he raised slightly more money from donors at or near the maximum allowable ($32 million) than from donors making contributions under $200 ($31.1 million). In short, Obama drew substantially from donors at all levels, unlike Paul, who drew heavily from donors making smaller contributions, or Clinton or Guiliani, who relied heavily on max-out contributors.
While small contributions have increased tremendously in this election cycle, they make up only a slightly larger part of the fundraising pie for most candidates. Large donations have also increased, led again by large-donor hierarchies. In late 2007, Public Citizen and the Campaign Finance Institute estimated that bundlers, such as members of Hillary Clinton's "Hillraisers" and Obama's "National Finance Committee," had raised about 40 percent of these candidates' money (Weissman and Lincoln 2007, 2) . Since so much of the funding in 2008 has come online and through small donations, it is likely that bundlers' relative contribution (and, some would argue, relevance) has decreased in recent months (Horowitz 2008) .
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PARTY COMMITTEES
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As noted, BCRA increased the maximum amount an individual could contribute to party committees. To what extent have party committees tapped into this source of funds? Have party committees seen the same surge in small, unitemized contributions in the last two presidential election cycles? To explore these questions we contrast in Table 5 Table 5 looks at total 2-year cycle  contributions, unlike Tables 1-4 which report data only on the year or years before the year of the election.
Looking only at total contributions from individuals, the Democratic National Committee made dramatic gains in 2004, to surpass the RNC in total contributions from individuals. The DNC raised just under $357 million from individuals, compared to the RNC's $350 million. The RNC did better among max-out donors than the DNC in 2004, but the DNC outperformed the RNC in unitemized donors, $166 million compared to $157 million. Contrary to the speculation of some prior to the implementation of BCRA, the soft money ban did not "short-circuit the efforts . . . to revitalize political parties" (Milkis 43 ).
Looking at the same time period for the DSCC, the change is even more dramatic. Transfers from State or other National Parties $6, 560, 050 $378, 869 $466, 738 $3, 522, 399 $4, 655, 873 $4, 556, 649 Note: This table includes federal or "hard" money only. 
CONCLUSION
The dramatic growth in the numbers of individuals contributing to presidential candidates and the surge in total amounts being contributed has generated substantial media attention in the 2008 presidential election. What is less well understood is that individuals are giving more, in part, because the limits were raised by BCRA. More research needs to be done on what is motivating more people to give in 2008, but clearly there is a higher level of interest in this election, at least as measured by campaign contributions. But the increase in political giving by individuals is not limited to presidential candidates. It is part of a broader pattern that started in the 2004 election cycle and continued in 2006. Part of the increase may be driven by the ease of contributing via the Internet, part of it may be due to passion about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and some of it may be due to enthusiasm for the candidates. Whatever the motivation, increased giving is not isolated to the 2008 presidential contest and therefore may have long-lasting significance.
